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Abstract
Large shareholders may play an important role for firm policies and performance, but 
identifying an effect empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of 
ownership structures.  However, unlike other blockholders, individuals tend to hold 
blocks in corporations that are located close to where they live.  Using this fact, we create 
an instrument – the density of wealthy individuals near a firm’s headquarters – for the 
presence of a large, non-managerial individual shareholder in a public firm.  We show 
that these shareholders have a large impact on firms.  Consistent with theories of large 
shareholders as monitors, we find that they increase firm profitability, increase dividends, 
reduce corporate cash holdings, and reduce executive compensation. Consistent with the 
view that there exist conflicts between large and small owners in public firms, we 
uncover evidence of substitution toward less tax-efficient forms of distribution (dividends 
over repurchases).  In addition, our analysis shows that large shareholders reduce the 
liquidity of the firm’s stock.   
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1. Introduction
Does having a large shareholder affect a firm?  A corporation’s shareholders legally control the 
firm, but they often delegate this control to managers.  In large public companies, which have small, 
dispersed shareholders, owners may find it costly to coordinate and exercise control, leaving managers 
considerable discretion. The resulting agency problems between owners and managers may be severe.  
Large shareholders may play a beneficial role in remedying these managerial agency problems.
1
Concentrating a block of votes and cash flow rights in the hands of a single decision maker reduces free-
riding incentives and facilitates effective owner control.  Having a large shareholder can, for example, 
restrain managers from extracting rents, reduce the free-riding problem in takeovers, and, if the large 
owners have long horizons, mitigate myopic investment behavior.  In contrast, other theories predict that 
blocks may be detrimental to firms.  Large shareholders can reduce managerial initiative and share 
liquidity.
2  Which of these theories, if any, are empirically valid? 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the effects of blockholders in large, public firms.  Our 
main contribution is to overcome the endogeneity of ownership structure: large shareholders are not 
allocated randomly to firms, but choose in which firms to invest.  Correlations between firm performance 
and ownership structure may reflect either large shareholders’ investment selection, or the effect of 
blockholders on firm performance.  We develop an instrument for the presence of large shareholders and 
quantify the impact of these blockholders using a two stage regression framework.  We can thus identify 
the impact of large owners, eliminating the selection bias in OLS.  Our instrument is based on economic 
arguments regarding geographic variation in the supply of large non-managerial individual shareholders.   
                                                     
1 We use the terms “large shareholder” and “blockholder” interchangeably. 
2 An incomplete list of papers concerning the theory of large shareholders include  Berle and Means (1932), 
Grossman and Hart (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jensen (1986), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), Stein (1988), Roe (1990), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Bhide (1993), Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), 
Bolton and von Thadden (1998), and Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003).  We review the existing literature on 
large shareholders in Section 2.   2
We begin by collecting data on the geographic location of large shareholders relative to the firms 
in which they are invested.  We show that outside individuals, as opposed to institutions such as mutual 
funds and money managers, who own blocks often invest locally.
3  This finding may reflect informational 
advantages in selecting and monitoring local companies (see, e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Coval 
and Moskowitz (2001) and Lerner (1995)).  Given that block investment by individuals tends to be local, 
any geographic variation in the number of potential individual blockholders is likely to impact the 
frequency of individually owned blocks.  Large stakes in listed firms require vast resources, so only very 
wealthy individuals can become large shareholders.  We hypothesize that the existence of large individual 
shareholders varies with the local density of high net worth individuals.  We collect data on the density of 
high net worth individuals, i.e., the number of individuals with high net worth divided by the number of 
corporate headquarters of public firms located in a state.  This density shows considerable variation across 
U.S. states, from 228 high net worth individuals per corporate headquarter in Colorado to 2,500 in 
Alaska.  As predicted, we find that firms with headquarters located in states with more concentrated local 
wealth are more likely to have large blocks of shares held by individuals.  The effect is large: moving 
from the 25
th percentile state, Arizona, to the 75
th percentile state, Idaho, while holding everything else 
constant, changes the predicted probability of a local firm having at least one block from 8.7 percent to 
12.8 percent, i.e. increases the probability by almost fifty percent.  
The second part of our study employs the density of high net worth individuals as an instrument 
for the presence of large blocks. The validity of this measure as an instrument requires that density not 
impact firm performance or corporate policy choices except through its effect on block formation.  We 
consider it a priori unlikely that an unobservable economic factor explains both the geographic 
distribution of the density of high net-worth individuals in 1995, at the state-level, and simultaneously 
firm outcomes during our sample period (1996-2001).  We also address several possible objections to our 
approach.  First, while the density of high net worth individuals correlates with individual non-managerial 
                                                     
3 Throughout the paper, when we use the terms “individual shareholders” or “individual blocks” we exclude those 
held by current or former managers of the firm. 3
blocks, it does not predict the presence of large shareholdings by either managers or institutions.  Second, 
we show that measures of economic performance, such as per capita income in 1995, that vary at the 
state-level but economic theory suggests should not determine the supply of individual blockholders, have 
very little predictive power for the presence of individual blocks.  These findings support the conclusion 
that our instrument picks up variation in the supply of a specific type of blockholder. 
Using the density measure as an instrument, we examine the average effect of large shareholders 
on the firms in which they hold stakes.  We find that blockholders have a positive impact on firm 
operating profitability, and reduce investment slightly.  These results are consistent with theories of 
monitoring by large shareholders.  Also, we find that large shareholders alter payout policy, in two ways.  
First, total payout increases in the presence of a block, consistent with monitoring theories and managerial 
reluctance to part with firm resources.  Second, dividends replace repurchases, consistent with a 
blockholder preference for a form of payout that maintains blockholder voting power.  The net effect on 
payout is an increase.  In addition, large shareholders also seem to cause lower cash holdings.  Examining 
CEO pay, we find that firms with large shareholders have a significantly lower average pay, especially in 
the form of options and stock.  Board representation appears to be one channel through which large 
shareholders exert their influence because we find that firms with large shareholders have a larger number 
of outside directors.  Finally, we find a strong negative effect of blockholders on share liquidity, 
consistent with standard theories of trading in the presence informed parties.  
Our evidence is consistent with the view that managers behave differently when a firm has a 
“principal” in the form of a large shareholder.  One interpretation of this evidence is that agency problems 
between owners and managers of public firms are important and that large shareholders increase 
monitoring and owner influence over firms.  This idea was first suggested by Berle and Means (1932) and 
has been instrumental in many theories since.  Why are these blockholders so important and why can their 
function not be provided by other governance mechanisms, such as product market competition (Nickell 
(1996)) or institutional owners (e.g., Hartzell and Starks (2003))?  One possibility is that non-managerial 
individual owners are particularly suited to monitor firms.  Individuals are free from many of the 4
constraints on active participation in corporate governance faced by many institutional investors (e.g., 
Black (1990)). Individuals also avoid the agency problems from which institutions inevitably suffer 
(Diamond (1984)).   
The existing empirical literature on the effects of concentrated ownership is extensive.
4  Our 
approach differs from earlier studies of large shareholders in three important ways.  First, we explicitly 
model the potential supply of blockholders to which a particular firm is exposed.  Somewhat surprisingly, 
the economics of the supply side of blocks is relatively unexplored in the literature, perhaps because the 
focus has been on partial equilibrium results (see Gorton and Kahl (2008) for an exception).  Second, 
compared to most previous work, our approach is more supportive of a causal interpretation of 
blockholder effects than studies relying on direct correlations.  The use of instruments to tackle 
endogeneity problems in the study of ownership and firm performance was originally suggested by 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), but few suitable instruments have been proposed.
5
Finally, our study adds to a growing literature that attempts to address endogeneity in corporate 
governance.  Other papers include Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) (changes in antitakeover laws) and 
Pérez-González (2005) (the abolishment of foreign majority ownership regulations in Mexico).  Several 
papers use the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an exogenous change (e.g., Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2007) and Hochberg, Sapienza and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007)).  In contrast to these papers 
which use changes in the law (i.e., a quasi-natural experiment) to overcome endogeneity problems, we 
develop an instrument for an important governance mechanism.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the role of large shareholders in the 
governance of large public corporations.  Section 3 describes our data sources and the construction of the 
instrument, and defines the firm variables of interest.   Section 4 introduces our empirical methodology.  
                                                     
4 See, e.g., Holderness (2003) for an overview of U.S. evidence, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for on overview of 
international evidence, and McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Mehran (1995) for evidence on blockholders and 
firm performance. 
5 Because we use an instrument for the local supply of potential blockholders, our estimates are likely to be the sum 
of the effect of an actual block and that of a higher threat of block formation in certain locations.  Our empirical 
approach does not distinguish between these two effects.   5
Section 5 evaluates the instrument and studies the impact of large shareholders on firm performance and 
corporate policies.  Section 6 concludes.   
2. Corporate governance and large shareholders   
2.1. Why large shareholders may matter 
The shareholders of a firm have extensive legal rights to oversee its management and make 
decisions, but as Berle and Means (1932) point out, public corporations tend to be owned by a large 
number of small shareholders and this ownership dispersion makes it difficult for owners to exert control 
(see also Jensen (1986)).  Small, dispersed owners must overcome coordination problems in order to 
exercise effective control of the firm, and their incentives to take any action aiming to increase firm value 
are weakened by free-riding problems (Grossman and Hart (1980)).  Under these circumstances, effective 
control in firms with dispersed ownership will tend to revert to managers – a state Berle and Means refer 
to as “separation of ownership and control.”
6
Large shareholders have long been considered a potential remedy to this problem.  By 
concentrating votes and cash flow rights in the hand of a single decision maker, a block of shares may 
eliminate the coordination problem.  A large block may provide sufficient financial incentive for an 
owner to incur monitoring costs and costs of intervention, thus partially overcoming the free-riding 
problem.  The benefits from such large shareholders can be manifold.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest 
that large owners restrain managers from consuming firm resources.  In the model of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), large shareholders reduce free-riding problems in takeovers.  Stein (1988) and Stein (1989) 
suggest that large owners with long investment horizons can mitigate myopic investment behavior. 
Managers may disagree with owners on payout policy, wanting to reduce dividends (Easterbrook (1984) 
and Jensen (1986)).  This effect may be alleviated by the presence of a large shareholder.   
                                                     
6 There is a large literature on owner-manager agency conflicts.  Demsetz (1983) argues that a manager may extract 
non-pecuniary benefits to the detriment of shareholders.  Jensen (1986) and Jensen (1989) argue that managers 
expropriate small, dispersed shareholders by diverting corporate resources for empire building or perk consumption.   6
The benefits of large shareholders may come at a cost, however.  The possibility of intervention 
by owners can reduce managerial initiative (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997)).  Even when the 
presence of a block is ex post efficient, the possibility of future interference may reduce a manager’s ex
ante incentive to undertake value-increasing effort, such as searching for good investment opportunities.  
Moreover, by keeping some shares off the public market, blockholders reduce share liquidity, thereby 
potentially reducing information production in the stock market (Holmstrom and Tirole (1993)),
7 and 
possibly limiting the threat of takeovers (Bolton and von Thadden (1998)).   
Another cost of large shareholders, from the perspective of small shareholders, is that they may 
have preferences that diverge from value maximization.  Fama and Jensen (1983) show that large 
shareholders, because they are undiversified, may favor investment choices that differ from value-
maximization.  Similar arguments can be made regarding the choice of capital structure.  More pernicious 
still is the possibility of transfers from other owners to blockholders (e.g., Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2000)).  Berle and Means (1932) state that large shareholders “can serve their own 
pockets better by profiting at the expense of the company than by making profits for it” (p. 114), although 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that this problem is likely to be more severe outside the U.S.  
The theories cited above tend to make little distinction between types of large shareholders.  In 
practice, different shareholders are likely to differ substantially in the extent to which they participate 
actively in the governance of firms.  For example, many mutual funds refrain from active participation, 
either because of regulatory constraints (e.g., Black (1990)) or because they are afraid of losing future 
money management business (e.g., Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) and Davis and Kim (2007)).  
Individual shareholders are less constrained from being active.  Also, individuals are likely to come with 
relatively few agency problems of their own, unlike other investor types (e.g., Diamond (1984)).  For 
these reasons, it is useful to study individual blockholders when evaluating theories of large shareholders.  
Finally, we note that the above theories refer to the potential impact on firms of large non-managerial
                                                     
7 Maug (1998) points out that liquidity may affect the cost of forming blocks, so causality plausibly runs both ways. 7
shareholders.  As a result, we exclude all blocks held by either current or former managers from our 
empirical analysis.   
2.2. Predicted effects of large shareholders 
We group the effects that theory has proposed for large shareholders into three categories: Effects 
that benefit all shareholders, effects that benefit only the large shareholder, and indirect effects of large 
shareholders.  We will now discuss the empirical predictions for each category in more detail.   
2.2.1. Monitoring  
Several of the theories suggest that large shareholders can increase the operational performance 
of a firm by monitoring management, thereby improving project selection, investment levels, and 
reducing costs.  For example, the existence of a block can mitigate the potential overinvestment problem 
by reducing corporate investment in declining industries where there is relative scarcity of investment 
opportunities and positive NPV projects.  We examine the impact of large shareholders on several 
measures of profitability (e.g., ROA), investment levels and cost cutting policy.   
Some theories suggest that large shareholders affect firms’ financial policies, such as capital 
structure, cash, and payout policy.  Consider for example payout policy.  Managers may prefer less 
payout to shareholders because such payments reduce the resources under the managers’ control and 
subject the managers to the scrutiny of capital markets if the firm needs to use external finance to fund 
new projects (e.g., Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986)). The monitoring of a large shareholder may 
restrict managers from reducing payouts to shareholders or from holding too much cash. To examine 
these predictions, we test whether individual blocks affect corporate payout policy and cash holdings.  
Whether CEOs in the U.S. are “overpaid” and in part able to set their own pay is a question that 
has been subject to a lot of recent discussion and academic research (see Bebchuk and Fried (2004) for a 
review).  As a result, it is interesting to study the extent to which the existence of a block in a firm reduces 
CEO pay.  Large shareholders are predicted to mitigate rent extraction by a firm’s management.   8
2.2.2. Private benefits
Large shareholders may pursue activities that deviate from the interests of minority shareholders.
8
The most extreme of such activities, the transfer of assets and profits out of firms or ‘tunneling’, may not 
be relevant in our study because we focus on large, public U.S. firms and on large shareholders that are 
not managers of the firm.  However, even large non-managerial shareholders may have interests that 
diverge from those of minority shareholders.  Large shareholders may influence investment policy.  For 
example, they may want to reduce the risk of the firm’s operations because of their lack of diversification. 
Large shareholders may curtail new investment if it requires accessing external capital markets, as the 
issue of new equity dilutes their stake.  For a similar reason, large shareholders may have a preference for 
dividends over more tax efficient repurchases (our sample period is 1996-2001) if they require payouts to 
finance their consumption. 
2.2.3. Liquidity
Some of the above theories predict that large shareholders may reduce the liquidity of a firm’s 
shares by keeping shares off the public market.  Furthermore, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) argue that one 
cause of stock market illiquidity is the presence of privately informed traders.  One such group of 
potentially privately informed traders is the group of blockholders.  Bhide (1993) argues that large active 
shareholders, who may reduce agency costs by monitoring managers, may also reduce stock liquidity by 
increasing informational asymmetries.  We test whether blocks impact the liquidity of a firm’s shares 
using the percentage bid-ask spread and the measure of illiquidity of Amihud (2002).   
3. Data
We exploit a number of existing data sources and also use several sources of original data.  This 
section describes in detail the nature of our data.   
                                                     
8 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for the importance of conflicts between small and 
large owners. 9
3.1. Data on large shareholders
We use the database of large publicly traded corporations in the U.S. and all their 5% 
blockholders compiled by Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers and Metrick (2006) (DFGM).
9  The database 
is an unbalanced panel of the S&P 1,500 universe, excluding dual-class firms, from 1996-2001.  It 
contains 1,919 different firms and 18,818 blockholder-firm-year observations.
10
We use this database to identify non-managerial individual blockholders.  This category of 
blockholders only includes individuals who are neither current nor former officers of the firm.  We 
therefore exclude from the non-managerial individual block category any block held by an individual who 
is, or at any point was an officer of the firm (e.g., a founder who retired but retained a 5% block).  We 
identify former and current officers through firms’ proxy statements and a Dow Jones Interactive news 
search.  Our dataset contains 1,079 non-managerial and 2,022 managerial individual blockholder-firm-
years.   
3.2. The location of large shareholders   
We obtain data on the geographic location (zip code) of each block in the DFGM database from 
firms’ proxy statements.  We exclude from our analysis blocks located abroad.  For some individuals who 
are officers or directors, the proxy statements do not give an explicit address, but state “Same address as 
company”.  We may thus underestimate the true distance between the location of some individuals and 
firm headquarters.  Also, some individuals may have multiple residences; we use the address reported in 
the proxy.  We obtain zip codes of firm headquarters from the Execucomp database, the Compact
Disclosure discs, or hand-collect them from proxy statements.  Finally, we identify the latitude and 
                                                     
9 Available from Wharton Research Data Services, http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/.  The use of annual data, as 
opposed to more frequent observations, may underestimate the true number of large shareholders because some 
blockholders can enter and exit our panel within a year, thus not showing up in firms’ proxy statements.  If some 
large shareholder chooses to own a stake below the 5% reporting threshold, they also do not show up in the proxy 
statements and in the DFGM database.   
10 The database has 20,975 blockholder entries.  However, not all of these entries are 5% blockholders.  For 
example, “Karen Smith” and “Peter Smith” are recorded in the raw data, but they jointly hold shares through the 
“Smith Family Trust.”  Conditioning on the final blockholder flag in the DFGM database will eliminate Karen 
Smith and Peter Smith, and retain only the Smith Family Trust.   10
longitude of each blockholder and firm by matching the zip codes to data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Gazetteer Place and Zip Code Database.
A plot of blockholder and firm locations reveals important patterns that are relevant for our 
analysis of large shareholders.  Figure 1 shows locations of individual blockholders.  These blockholders 
are distributed across the entire U.S.  Figure 2, on the other hand, shows the location of headquarters of 
mutual fund and money manager blockholders, the two largest categories of institutional investors.  Many 
of these blocks are located in cities with a significant financial industry.   
We compute the distance (in miles) from a blockholder to each of its investment firms’ 
headquarters using the methodology of Coval and Moskowitz (1999).  Table 1 reports that the median 
distance is small for non-managerial individual blocks (42.5 miles) and managerial blocks (0 miles).  
More than half of the non-managerial individual shareholders are located in the same state as the firm, 
and, perhaps not surprisingly, more than 90% of all managerial large shareholders are located in the same 
state as the corporate headquarters.  The results are significantly different for institutional investors.  The 
median distance between mutual fund (money manager) headquarters and the headquarters of the firms in 
which they own large stakes is 1,017 miles (858 miles).  Less than 10% of all mutual fund and money 
manager headquarters are located in the same state as the corporate headquarters of their block 
investments.
11
3.3. The geographic distribution of high net worth individuals   
Our data for the geographic distribution of wealth is from the Statistics of Income (SOI) program 
at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  It reports the number of high net worth individuals in each state, 
estimated from estate tax return filings.
12  An alternative data source for the distribution of wealth in the 
U.S. is the Survey of Consumer Finance.  Johnson and Moore (2002) compare the methodology and 
                                                     
11 Gaspar and Massa (2007) analyze the local ownership of mutual funds and find a local bias.  Their analysis is not 
inconsistent with ours.  They aggregate the local ownership of many different mutual fund managers working for 
different firms to calculate a measure of total ownership in the geographic proximity of a firm’s headquarters.  We 
aggregate shares across different fund managers within the same mutual fund family and attribute the total 
ownership to the location of the headquarters of the mutual fund family.  
12 For details, see IRS, Statistics of Income Bulletin, Winter 2002-2003, Publication 1136 (Rev. 4-2003). 11
wealth distributions from the SOI and SCF data, and find that they are similar.  Most importantly given 
our objective, SOI provides geographic information, whereas the SCF does not.
13
The SOI reports estimates of the number of high net-worth individuals by state in 1995, 1998 and 
2001 as well as their estimated average wealth.  The definition of high net worth varies somewhat from 
year to year.  In 1995, it is net wealth from $0.6 to $10 million (in terms of counting the total number of 
high net worth individuals, the upper cutoff likely makes a small difference).  In 1998 and 2001, the lower 
limit is $1 million of net wealth and there is no upper limit. The three cross-sections are similar.  We use 
the 1995 data since it predates all the ownership observations in our sample.  Figure 3 shows the density 
of high net worth individuals, defined as the number of high net worth individuals in 1995 divided by the 
total number of firms headquartered in the state (in 1995), based on SOI and information on firm 
headquarters from the Compustat database.   
We find significant geographic dispersion in the wealth density measure.  Across states, the 
median density (number of high net worth individuals per firm) is 565 (Oklahoma).  The mean is 664 
(between Mississippi and West Virginia).  The 25th and 75th percentiles are 419 (Arizona) and 733 
(Idaho), respectively.  The lowest two densities are 228 (Colorado) and 247 (Utah) and the highest two 
are 1,857 (North Dakota) and 2,500 (Alaska).  Of the top five states in terms of number of headquarters, 
California has a density of 442, Texas 299, New York 473, Florida 603 and Massachusetts 270.
14
Throughout, we normalize the measure so that it is measured in units of thousands of individuals per firm 
headquarter (i.e., the median is 0.565). 
                                                     
13 There are other subtle differences.  The SOI data are for individuals, whereas the SCF is household-based.  One 
advantage of the SOI dataset is that the sample size is significantly larger since the number of estate tax filings is on 
the order of 15,000 per year, which all correspond to a high net worth individual.  High net worth individuals are 
only about a tenth of those surveyed in the SCF (the 1994 SCF covers 4,522 families).  Also, the precision of the 
SOI may be somewhat better since tax authorities require detailed documentation to support the filings, whereas 
SCF is survey-based.  On the other hand, there may be financial incentives to misreport when filing with the IRS.   
14 These statistics are taken across the 50 states. Our sample, which is restricted to large firms, contains no firms 
headquartered in Alaska, for example. Across sample firms, the mean density is 460 individuals per firm and the 
standard deviation is 151. 12
3.4. Estimated wealth distributions   
Are the high net-worth individuals on which we base our instrument wealthy enough to own large 
stakes in the largest U.S. firms?  Substantial wealth is required to buy a 5% or larger stake in one of the 
firms in our sample.  To assess whether the estimated number of high net worth individuals and their 
estimated wealth are large enough to be consistent with the blocks we observe in our database, we 
estimate the number of wealthy individuals by state. Levy and Solomon (1997), Klass, Biham, Levy, 
Malcai and Solomon (2006), and Chatterjee, Sinha and Chakrabarti (2007) suggest that wealth 
distributions follow a power law for the top 5-10% of individuals (by wealth).  Such a power law implies 
a particular relationship between the number of people wealthy enough to be included in the SOI wealth 
data and those with any other particular wealth level (as long as that wealth level is still in the top 5-10% 
of individuals).   
We use the power law parameter of 1.36, as reported by Levy and Solomon (1997), to infer the 
top of the wealth distribution.
15 For this section, we use the 1998 SOI data.
16  Table 2 shows our estimates 
of the wealth distributions for Oregon (with the median number of millionaires: 27,000), Georgia (75
th
percentile: 64,000), New York (2
nd highest: 243,000), and California (highest: 412,000).  In these four 
states, the estimated wealth of the hundred richest individuals was $17.4 billion, $32.8 billion, $87.4 
billion, and $128.8 billion, respectively.  The number of ultra-wealthy individuals – with more than $100 
million in personal wealth – is 51 in Oregon and 122 in Georgia compared to 463 in New York and 785 in 
California.  The table also reports the number of sample firms in each state, the total market value of 
equity of these firms, and the median, average, and largest firm market values in 1999.  Five percent of 
the median firm’s market value across the four states is $43 million, $70 million, $171 million, and $58 
                                                     
15 Levy and Solomon (1997) use data from the 1996 Forbes 400 list of the richest people in the U.S. to back out the 
parameter of 1.36.  Klass et al. (2006) calculate an average parameter of 1.49 using the Forbes 400 lists during 
1988–2003.  We use the 1996 parameter as it just predates our sample.  
16 To be consistent with the rest of the paper, we would have preferred to use 1995 data for these calculations. 
However, the 1998 SOI has a format which makes it easier to work with.  Also, we have to use the SOI (1998) later 
on, as we match it to the Forbes 400 list. The 1998 Forbes list of the wealthiest Americans does, but the 1995 list 
does not, contain data on individuals’ principal residence, which we require.  Since the various SOI cross-sections 
are so similar, and since wealth distributions are stable over time, we expect we would get very similar results using 
1995 or 2001 data. 13
million, respectively, and there are 162, 198, 223, and 1,659 individuals with enough estimated wealth to 
buy such a stake (if they invested all their wealth).
17  The conclusion that emerges from our estimates in 
Table 2 is that there seems to be enough wealth for wealthy individuals to play a significant role as 
(potential) owners of large blocks of shares.   
The calculations in Table 2 depend on the accuracy of the power law distribution because they 
extrapolate the number of extremely wealthy individuals from the number of moderately wealthy 
individuals.  We have carried out the following calculation that shows that the extrapolation using the 
power law distribution works remarkably well.  Forbes publishes an annual list of the wealthiest 
Americans and their principal residences.  We therefore know the actual wealth of the 400 richest 
individuals by state of residence.  The minimum wealth required to make the 1998 list was $430 million.  
In a second step, we use the number of millionaires by state as reported by our data source, the SOI 
(1998) and the power law parameter of 1.36 estimated by Levy and Solomon (1997), to predict for each 
state the number of individuals with wealth greater than $430 million in 1998.  In a final step, we 
compare our estimates to the actual numbers from the 1998 Forbes list.  Figure 4 plots the actual against 
the predicted number of individuals with more than $430 million in each state.  The correlation 
coefficient is 0.89 and is highly statistically significant.  Thus, the power law distribution predicts 
remarkably well the geographic distribution of ultra wealthy individuals, using the distribution of only 
moderately wealthy individuals.   
3.5. Firm variables
The theories of large shareholders discussed in Section 2 predict that large shareholders can 
impact a broad set of corporate decisions.  We focus on five different sets of firm outcome variables:   
                                                     
17 Five percent ownership is the smallest size block that triggers a filing with the SEC and thus appears in our data. 14
(i) Operating performance.  We analyze return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS).  We 
also analyze investment levels (measured by capital expenditures) and cost cutting policy 
(measured by S, G & A expenditures).   
(ii) Capital structure.  We analyze measures of both book and market leverage.   
(iii) Resources and payout policy.  We analyze measures of payout policy and cash holdings.    
(iv) Managerial compensation and board structure.  We analyze the log of base CEO salary and 
the fraction of pay that is paid in equity.  We also analyze the number of outside directors on 
the board.
(v) Liquidity.  We analyze trading volume, the percentage bid-ask spread, and the illiquidity 
measure of Amihud (2002).   
Our data source for annual accounting variables is Compustat.  We exclude observations with 
independent variables in both the top and bottom 1%.
18  Our data sources for CEO compensation and 
board structure are the Execucomp database and the IRRC director database, respectively.  The data used 
to calculate the liquidity measures come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  All 
variables are defined in the Data Appendix.   
Table 3 reports summary statistics.  Panel A shows that there exists a non-managerial individual 
block in 11.8% of all firm-year observations. A manager (either current or former) holds a block in 21.9% 
of all firm-year observations.  More than two-thirds of all sample observations have a large mutual fund 
shareholder. Panel B reports means, medians, and standard deviations for the dependent and independent 
variables we use in Section 5. 
                                                     
18 We also used winsorizing at the 1% level with qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. 15
4. Empirical methodology
In this section, we introduce the econometric model that we employ to identify and quantify the 
impact of blocks. We also discuss the validity and economic plausibility of our instrument.   
4.1. Two-stage selection model
Most of the existing empirical literature in corporate finance that has studied the economic effects 
of large shareholders has estimated an equation of the following form:   
it it i t it it yd J GO H     ȕX  (1) 
where i indexes firms and t indexes years.   it y  is a firm performance or corporate policy variable that is 
expected to be affected by a blockholder,  i G  are industry fixed effects,  t O  are year fixed effects, and  it X
is a vector of time-varying firm-level controls, e.g., the size or age of the firm.   it d  is an indicator variable 
that is equal to 1 if a large shareholder is present in firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise.   it H  is an error term.   
It is problematic to draw causal inferences about the impact of blockholders on firm behavior 
from estimates of J  in equation (1), because there are economic reasons to expect that blocks are not 
randomly distributed across firms.  For example, growth options, managerial quality or firm size are 
potential determinants of corporate policy choices and firm performance. But the same variables may also 
be correlated with the existence of a large shareholder. Large shareholders may choose to invest in high 
growth firms with managers that have a good track record. It is easier for individuals to accumulate a 
block in a small firm with highly liquid stock.  If the vector  it X  does not include all relevant variables, 
the large shareholder indicator variable  it d  will be correlated with the error term in equation (1), and OLS 
estimates of J  will be biased. 
To address this endogeneity problem, we employ a two-stage selection model, following 
Heckman and Robb (1985).  The model we estimate differs from standard two-stage least squares (TSLS) 
models because of the binary nature of the endogenous variable of interest (the presence of a non-16
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where * it d  is a latent variable and  it w  is our instrument, a measure of local wealth density, i.e., the 
number of high net worth individuals per firm headquarter in a state.  We report estimates of the first 
stage using both linear probability models and probit models.   
In the second stage, firm performance or corporate policies are modeled and it is assessed how 
they are affected by the predicted probability of block presence in a firm.  The second stage equation is:   
it Block it i t it it yd J GO H      ȕX  (3) 
Since the only endogenous variable in equation (3) is an indicator variable, this model is 
sometimes referred to as a “dummy endogenous variable model” (Heckman (1978)). We assume that  it e
and it H  follow a joint normal distribution with a correlation coefficient of U.  The model is estimated by 
maximizing the joint likelihood function (see also Maddala (1983)).  The estimated coefficient  Block J
captures the effect of a large shareholder on yit.
If the error terms  it e  and  it H  are uncorrelated (U = 0), then the effect of large shareholders on firm 
performance or corporate policies can be consistently estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS).  If Uis
positive, then the coefficient J  estimated through OLS is overstated; if U is negative, then it will be 
understated.  We test whether Uis zero with a Chi-square test which is reported in all tables.   
The effect we estimate for large individual shareholders is referred to as a local average treatment 
effect (LATE), i.e. it reflects the average impact of blocks on firms which actually have a block in our 
sample. Our estimates are not necessarily valid more generally. For example, assigning a block to a 
random firm may have a smaller effect. Also, if the effect of blocks varies across firms, our estimates 17
refer to the average effect. For example, if blockholders increase executive pay in some firms but reduce 
it in others, the net effect might be indistinguishable from zero. 
4.2. Validity of instrument 
One condition for the validity of our instrument is the exclusion restriction, i.e., that the 
instrument is not correlated with the error term of the second stage equation.  Since we have only one 
instrument, it is not possible to implement a test based on overidentifying restrictions.  As Wooldridge 
(2002) puts it, “this condition has to be maintained” (p. 86). 
Another condition for the validity of our instrument is the requirement that the instrument and the 
endogenous variable be correlated once all other exogenous variables have been controlled for.  This 
condition can be tested using a simple t-test.  We report significant t-statistics (cluster- and 
heteroscedasticity-consistent) for our instrument in all first-stage regressions.   
Recent econometrics research has dealt with the “weak instrument problem” (e.g., Bound, Jaeger 
and Baker (1995), Nelson and Startz (1990), and Staiger and Stock (1997)), a situation where instruments 
are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variable (or variables).  In cases with a large number of 
instruments, each weakly correlated with the endogenous variable, standard estimators can be biased and 
confidence intervals understated.  This critique does not apply to our tests, as we only have a single 
instrument.  In a TSLS setting, Imbens and Wooldridge (2007) suggest that second stage confidence 
intervals will be large if an instrument is weak or irrelevant, i.e., standard methods of inference are 
reliable.  With the caveat that we use a probit selection equation in the first stage, this suggests that our 
test statistics are accurate.
19  Moreover, with weak instruments, TSLS estimations are biased toward OLS 
estimates (see Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995)).  Because we find significant differences between IV and 
                                                     
19 Staiger and Stock (1997) develop a rule of thumb for sufficient significance of the incremental power of 
instruments (in the case of one instrument, the squared t-test should be approximately 10).  Several issues prevent us 
from using their rule of thumb.  First, we estimate a probit first stage equation.  Second, we cluster our standard 
errors by state such that we violate the iid assumption upon which their test is based. 18
OLS estimates (see Section 6), this again suggests that our results are unlikely to suffer from a weak 
instrument problem.   
4.3. Economic plausibility of instrument
Our identification strategy employs the density of high net worth individuals as an instrument for 
the presence of a non-managerial individual block in local firms.  We think this is economically plausible 
for the following reasons.  First, personal wealth is likely a key determinant of an individual’s ability to 
accumulate a large position of equity in a public firm.  If there are limits to individuals’ access to 
financing, vast personal wealth is required to become a blockholder in a firm.  In practice, this is almost 
certainly true. Second, investors are prone to investing locally.  For several reasons, individual 
blockholders are likely to exhibit a preference for investments in firms that are headquartered close by.  
For example, monitoring costs may be lower, making blocks in such firms more desirable (see Lerner 
(1995) for evidence in the context of venture capitalists), or individuals may have better information 
about local firms.  Indeed, we found in section 3.2 that the non-managerial individual blockholders in our 
sample tend to be located close to their firms (and much closer than institutional investors).  Finally, there 
is substantial variation in the density of wealthy individuals across space.  Glaeser (1998) provides several 
theoretical reasons for why wealthy individuals may want to live close to each other, and thus why there 
could be variation in the density measure across states. Indeed, we found in section 3.3 that there is 
significant dispersion in the density of wealthy individuals across U.S. states.   
4.4. Example: Bill Gates’s block in Avista Corp.
The nature of our identification strategy can be most easily explained with an example.  In our 
sample, the density of millionaires per corporate headquarter in the State of Washington is above average 
(recall that this is based on estate tax filings).  One of our sample firms is Avista Corporation (formerly 
Washington Water & Power), located in Spokane, WA.  On January 20, 2000, Cascade Investment, LLC, 
bought a 5% block in Avista.  The SEC filing reveals that Microsoft-founder Bill Gates is the sole 19
member of Cascade Investment.  Gates resides, and Cascade Investment is located, in the state of 
Washington.  Therefore, Gates bought a non-managerial individual block that is geographically close. 
If wealthy individuals invested randomly across the U.S., our instrument would have no 
explanatory power in the first stage regressions. Since wealthy individual investors – just like Bill Gates – 
invest locally, our instrument will be positively correlated with the existence of non-managerial 
individually owned blocks.   
5. Results
5.1. Block presence and high net worth individuals  
We begin our empirical analysis by reporting results from the first stage regression, in which we 
predict the presence of a non-managerial individual block in a firm.  Table 4 shows that the density of 
wealthy individuals in a particular geographic region significantly predicts the presence of a large 
shareholder in a firm located in the same region.  In column (1), we estimate a linear probability model by 
OLS.  The coefficient (0.190) implies that a one standard deviation increase in the density of high net 
worth individuals (0.420) increases the block probability by nearly eight percentage points.  The 
economic magnitude of the estimated effect is large when considering that the mean probability of having 
a non-managerial individual block is 11.8% in our sample.
20
The linear probability model is possibly a poor fit, since probabilities are close to zero.  In 
columns (2) through (4), we estimate probit regressions with and without year-fixed, industry-fixed, and 
firm controls.
21  Our conclusion that block presence in a firm is significantly predicted by the density of 
                                                     
20 This standard deviation is across states (i.e. fifty observations). Taking a standard deviation across firms yields a 
lower number (because few firms are located in the states with extreme densities). A firm-based standard deviation 
is density is 0.151. An increase in the density of 0.151 increases the probability of a block by approximately 2% 
(starting from the sample mean probability of 11.8%). 
21 We use Fama-French industries in all regression specifications in the paper, but the results are very similar when 
we use 2-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industries.   20
local wealth is robust and does not change across specifications.
22  The coefficients on the control 
variables appear to be economically plausible. Non-managerial blockholders seem to be present in smaller 
firms with significant sales growth. Firm age is positively correlated with the existence of a non-
managerial individual blockholder, which suggests that non-managerial individuals do not invest in the 
youngest sample firms.  
In addition, we analyze the magnitude of the estimated effects.  In column (4), we find that 
around the sample mean probability of having an individual block, the effect of increasing the density of 
high net worth individuals by one standard deviation is to increase the block probability by about 7.1 
percentage points.  For a firm that is one standard deviation smaller (log assets is 1.5 lower) and ten years 
younger, but that is otherwise at the average block probability, the effect of an increase in the density of 
high net worth individuals by one standard deviation is to increase the block probability from 26% to 
37%.   
In the remaining three columns of the table, we report several robustness checks.  In column (5), 
we replace the wealthy individual density measure by wealth per listed firm in a state in 1995, thus 
incorporating information on the high net worth individuals’ average wealth from the 1995 SOI.  At the 
sample mean, a one standard deviation increase of wealth per listed firm increases the predicted 
probability of an individual block by 6.6 percentage points. Hence, the economic and statistical 
significance is very similar across columns (4) and (5).  In column (6), we report a linear specification 
with the log of one plus the ownership by non-managerial individual blockholders as the dependent 
variable.  Again, there is a significant positive coefficient for wealth density.
 23
As the results from several different regression specifications in Table 4 show, variations on our 
basic first stage methodology give similar results. In the rest of the paper, we report results using the 
                                                     
22 It can be argued that individual and institutional blocks are substitutes.  In untabulated regressions, we have 
included an indicator variable for the existence of a large mutual fund, money manager, or other institutional owner 
in a firm.  These control variables do not change any of the reported results.   
23 When entered separately, the two components of our density measure (the number of high net worth individuals 
and the number of firm headquarters) are each statistically significantly related to the presence of a large individual 
shareholder. This is true for all specifications in Table 4 involving individual shareholders.  21
density of high net worth individuals and a probit selection model with the large individual shareholder 
dummy.  Finally, in column (7), we show that the predictive power of the density of wealthy individuals 
is restricted to non-managerial blocks. Our instrument does not significantly predict the existence of a 
managerial block. 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the results of the various first stage regressions is 
that blocks are not randomly distributed across firms.  We find that small firms with high sales growth but 
low lagged returns have a significantly higher probability of having a large shareholder, all else being 
equal.  Thus, we identify significant selection effects – blockholders are more likely to invest in certain 
types of firms.  Furthermore, both observable and unobservable variables that determine the presence of a 
blockholder such as firm size or quality of management are likely to be important in the second stage 
regressions as well.  This is important as it implies that causal inference regarding the impact of blocks on 
firms is not possible from standard econometric models such as equation (1) and OLS, because the 
treatment effects of blocks are confounded with selection effects.  For all of the remaining regressions in 
the paper, we therefore use instrumental variable regressions.   
5.2. Operating performance  
Table 5 reports evidence on the effect of large shareholders on operating performance.  We find 
that blockholders have a significant and positive effect on return on assets (ROA).  In column (1), we find 
that the coefficient on the block indicator variable is 0.029 and statistically significant at the 5% level.  
This corresponds to 2.9 percentage points higher operating profitability, all else equal, in firms with a 
large individual shareholder. This is large in economic terms given the mean ROA in our sample is 4.7% 
(the standard deviation is 10.4%).  For robustness purposes, we replace ROA with ROS (profits scaled by 
sales) in column (2). The impact of large shareholders remains positive and significant.  The positive 
estimated effect of large shareholders on profitability supports theories of large shareholders as monitors.   
The estimated correlation of the error terms in the first and second stage is negative and 
significant, meaning that large shareholders tend to invest in firms with relatively low profitability 22
(holding other firm level variables constant).  Thus, endogeneity will tend to bias downward OLS 
estimates of the impact of blocks on operating performance.  
There are several potential sources of the positive block impact on profitability, such as 
improving project selection, changing investment levels, and cutting costs.  Our dataset allows us to 
analyze some of these sources.  In column (3), we find that S, G & A expenditures do not seem to be 
significantly impacted by the presence of a large shareholder in a firm.  If more efficient cost cutting is 
not responsible for the effect on operating profitability, another potential source of the efficiency increase 
is that large shareholders improve investment levels by, e.g., reducing overinvestment.  In column (4), we 
find that investment levels of firms are about 5.5% lower in the presence of a block in the firm, although 
this effect is only significant at the 10% level.  We also find that blockholders tend to select firms that 
invest more, all else equal (ȡ is positive).  This is consistent with blockholders mitigating overinvestment 
problems, but also with other theories suggesting that large shareholders restrain investment (e.g., Stulz 
(2005)). For example, large shareholders may be reluctant to provide more funds for new projects 
themselves, but also do not want other investors to increase their equity stakes for fear of losing voting 
power.
5.3. Capital structure 
We next examine the impact of large shareholders on leverage and capital structure.  The 
evidence on capital structure is reported in Table 6.  We study three measures in columns (1)-(3): book 
leverage, long term book leverage, and market leverage.  Across all measures, we find that the coefficient 
on the block indicator variable is negative, but the coefficient is only significant, at the 10% level, for one 
of the three specifications (long-term book leverage in column (2)).  The coefficient in column (2) implies 
3.9 percentage points lower long-term book leverage for firms with a large blockholder, which can be 
compared to the average ratio of 21% in our sample.   
One interpretation of this evidence is that large shareholders have little impact on firms’ capital 
structure decisions, but an important caveat that applies to this finding is that heterogeneity across blocks 23
can also explain the lack of significant blockholder impact on leverage.  Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 
(2008) show that different blockholders are associated with significant leverage effects, but that some 
have a positive and others have a negative association.  If some non-managerial large shareholders have a 
positive effect on leverage ratios while others have a negative effect, then we could estimate a zero 
average effect.   
5.4. Resources and payout policy   
Table 7 reports evidence on payout policy and cash holdings.  We analyze three measures of 
payout policy in columns (1)-(3): book dividend yield, market dividend yield, and dividend payout ratio.  
Controlling for selection effects in block presence, we find that blocks significantly increase dividends.
The magnitudes of the effects implied by our estimates are large: a block in a firm is estimated to 
approximately double the book and market dividend yields compared to the means.  Moreover, we find 
that blockholders tend to select firms with low dividends relative to otherwise similar firms.  For the 
dividend payout ratio (dividends scaled by EBITDA instead of equity), we find that large shareholders 
increase the ratio. The estimated effect is 0.226, or approximately half a standard deviation. This effect is 
significant at the 10% level.
A caveat applies to this finding, related to recent evidence on dividend catering.  Becker, Ivkoviü
and Weisbenner (2007) find that firms have higher dividend yields at locations where seniors constitute a 
large fraction of the population.  It is possible that managers also cater to high net-worth individuals in the 
geographic area of a firm’s headquarters.  Yet, we consider catering of the payout policy to wealthy 
individuals an unlikely explanation for our result, because the U.S. tax code during the period we study 
did not favor dividends as a means of distributing resources to shareholders in the highest tax brackets.   
We also document that large shareholders significantly reduce firms’ cash holdings.  In column 
(4), we find that the coefficient on the instrumented block indicator variable is -0.057 and statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  This effect is economically large: cash holdings (as a fraction of total assets) 24
of firms with blocks are smaller by 5.7 percentage points, compared to a sample mean of about 18%.  
Thus, cash is reduced by about a third in firms with large shareholders.   
  A main area of conflicts of interest between owners and managers is managers’ preference for 
retaining assets and resources within the firm (Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986)).  The evidence 
presented in Table 7 suggests that large shareholders increase dividends and reduce cash holdings. Our 
findings are supportive of theories about managerial resource grab and are consistent with the hypothesis 
that monitoring by large shareholders can restrain managers from retaining too many resources inside the 
firm.  However, large shareholders may value dividends and repurchases differently than other owners. 
For example, their tax situation might be different.  Furthermore, large blockholders may have a desire to 
obtain cash (e.g., to finance consumption) while maintaining voting power.  If this motivates payouts, we 
would expect to see some substitution from repurchases to dividends.  In order to examine this, we 
replace the dividend payout ratio with the repurchase payout ratio (calculated the same way as the 
dividend payout ratio).  Results are reported in column (5).  It turns out that large individual shareholders 
have a negative effect on repurchases, consistent with the substitution hypothesis.  The coefficient is 
approximately half of the coefficient on dividend payout, suggesting that while substitution is an 
important part of the increased dividends, there is also a positive net impact on payout.
24  Overall, the 
payout results suggest that while large shareholders mitigate agency problems between owners and 
managers, they also create new agency conflicts between different owners. 
5.5. Managerial compensation and board structure  
If large blockholders influence firms as much as suggested by the results on performance, capital 
structure and payout, it is natural to ask how.  In this section we examine two tools blockholders may 
employ to influence the firms in which they invest, the incentives for the firm’s CEO and the board.  
Evidence on compensation and board structure is reported in Table 8.  In columns (1) and (2), results are 
                                                     
24 We have verified this using the aggregate payout ratio as well as the aggregate payout yield. Both of these are 
positively associated with large shareholders. 25
reported for two measures of CEO pay: the log of total CEO pay and the fraction of CEO pay that is paid 
in the form of firm stock or options.  Our results point to significantly lower CEO pay and lower incentive 
pay for CEOs running firms in which blockholders have a stake.  The coefficient estimate in column (1) 
implies a reduction in CEO pay of 0.8 of a standard deviation in the presence of a blockholder.  
Moreover, incentive pay is a smaller fraction of total compensation by about 0.4 (the mean is 0.5; a 
standard deviation is 0.3).
25 In both regressions, there is a positive and significant correlation between 
first and second stage error terms which implies that firms with unusually high CEO pay packages seem 
to attract blocks. 
The evidence of lower CEO pay is consistent with several theories. First, this finding is consistent 
with the joint hypotheses that CEOs use pay to try to extract rents (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)) and that 
blockholders mitigate such managerial agency problems by monitoring CEO compensation.  Second, the 
lower incentive pay is consistent with substitution of different governance mechanisms: firms with a non-
managerial individual blockholder as a monitor do not need as much pay-for-performance sensitivity to 
align the interests of owners and management.
26
It seems large shareholders often work through the corporate board.  In Table 8, we find that there 
are 1.6 more outside directors in firms with a blockholder. The effect is economically large, because the 
average firm in our sample has a total of about seven outside directors.  This suggests that large 
blockholders exert influence on corporate policies, and thus ultimately affect operating performance, 
through the board.   
                                                     
25 Our estimates correspond to an average reduction in CEO pay by about $1.5M, almost all in terms of incentive 
pay. Note also that many CEOs receive $1M in cash pay for tax reasons, which may explain why incentive are a 
lower part of total pay for CEOs with lower total compensation. 
26 Another possibility is that firms with blockholders hire different CEOs.  For example, it may be less enjoyable to 
run a firm with strong owners and the possibility of intervention by large owners can reduce managerial initiative 
(Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997)), or the need for a skilled CEO is lower for firms with large active 
blockholders, so those firms hire a less expensive CEO.   26
5.6. Liquidity
The theoretical prediction for stock market liquidity is particularly problematic to evaluate 
empirically using a standard OLS estimation procedure, because as argued by Maug (1998), blocks are 
more easily and inexpensively formed in firms with more liquid shares.  This prediction has some support 
in the data because we document that blockholders tend to select firms with relatively high trading 
volume.  Using our two-stage selection model, we can isolate the causal effect of blocks on liquidity 
without selection effects impacting the estimates.
Table 9 reports our evidence on liquidity and large shareholders.  We analyze three measures of 
liquidity: trading volume, bid-ask spread, and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure.  Our estimates show 
economically large negative effects of blocks on liquidity.  In column (1), we find that trading volume is 
reduced by about half a standard deviation in the presence of a block.  Because this may simply be the 
result of a smaller free float of shares among firms with blocks, we also analyze alternative measures.  In 
column (2), the estimated coefficient on the large shareholder indicator variable implies that a block 
increases the bid-ask spread by about one standard deviation.  In column (3), we find that Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity measure increases by a quarter of a standard deviation when a block is present in a firm.   
The evidence in the table that blocks significantly reduce the liquidity of a firm’s shares supports 
the predictions by Holmström and Tirole (1993) and Bhide (1993), and implies that one side effect of 
large shareholders in public firms is lower stock liquidity and less information production about the firm.   
5.7. Robustness of results  
We conduct several tests to check the robustness of our results.  First, because the variation in our 
instrument is driven by state-wide differences, a concern is that we are capturing differences across states 
that are correlated with blockholder presence but have little to do with the economic explanations we 
provide.  Therefore, we re-estimate the first stage selection equation with “placebo instruments” that vary 
across states, but that we do not expect to predict the presence of a block in a firm.  These measures are: 
population density, income inequality, per capita income (median and average), and the poverty rate.   27
Table 10 reports the results.  When we include all the state-level variables mentioned above in 
addition to our instrument, with or without year and industry fixed effects, we find that none of these 
variables significantly predicts the existence of an individual block.  The coefficient on our instrument 
remains positive and statistically significant.   
Another concern is that the denominator of our density measure uses the number of firm 
headquarters in an area, which may be correlated with many factors unrelated to the supply of wealthy 
individuals who are potential blockholders. For example, information about a firm may be more easily 
obtained where there are only a few firms in the geographic region.  We have included the two 
components of our instrument separately in a regression (i.e., the number of individuals with high net 
worth and one divided by the number of corporate headquarters of public firms located in a state).  We 
find that both measures have independent and significant power in explaining the large shareholder 
dummy.  The effect of wealth is larger and more significant.  This cannot be explained by the 
informational advantage argument or other factors correlated with the number of local firm 
headquarters.
27
When examining a local bias in institutional holdings, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) estimate 
regressions in which they exclude the New York metropolitan area, because so many mutual funds and 
firm headquarters are located in New York City.  The inclusion of New York City could lead to an 
overestimate of the local bias. In our case, it may be that many rich individuals deem New York City an 
attractive city in which to live, and at the same time, they hold blocks in one of the many firms in New 
York.  When we exclude the New York City area to see whether it drives our results, we find that the 
economic and statistical significance of the estimated first stage coefficient of the instrument increases.  
Some non-managerial individual large shareholders that are also directors do not provide their 
address in the proxy statement, but state “same address as company”.  To make sure that these 
observations do not drive our results, we re-estimate all regressions excluding blocks with zero distance 
                                                     
27 These and other untabulated regressions are available from the authors upon request.   28
between the location of the blockholder and the firm’s headquarters. The results of these regressions are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in Tables 5 through 9. 
Our instrument is based on the high net worth distribution for 1995, because it predates our full 
sample.  We have also used 1995 SOI data for 1996-1998 and 1998 data for 1999-2001 (the last year in 
our sample), as well as 1998 data for all years, with very small differences in the results.   
6. Discussion and conclusions
Are policy choices and corporate performance different when a large shareholder is present in a 
firm?  While there exist many theoretical models of large shareholders which imply that blocks can 
influence firm behavior and outcomes, empirical examinations potentially suffer from endogeneity 
problems because there are economic reasons to expect that blocks are not randomly distributed across 
firms.  Although this endogeneity concern has been long recognized and instrumental variable solutions 
have been suggested (at least since Demsetz and Lehn (1985)), the problem has proven difficult to 
overcome:  It is hard to find an instrument that fulfills the exclusion restriction. 
We employ an instrumental variable approach that consistently estimates coefficients for a subset 
of large shareholders (non-managerial individual blockholders). We show that firm characteristics 
systematically predict the existence of a large non-managerial blockholder and that therefore selection 
effects are important, as predicted by theory.  Because of the systematic selection of firms into ownership 
structures, the second-stage coefficients of the instrumented large shareholder dummy are statistically and 
economically different from large shareholder coefficients obtained via the standard OLS model.  Table 
11 highlights this finding by comparing the two stage selection model estimates with OLS estimates.  The 
differences in economic magnitude and significance are substantial.   
We find that large shareholders have a significant impact on operating performance, corporate 
policies, and the liquidity of the firm’s stock.  Consistent with theories of large shareholders as monitors, 
we show that profitability and payout ratios are higher, and cash holdings and CEO pay are lower with a 29
large shareholder present in a firm.  Large shareholders may also take actions that are not in the interest of 
other shareholders, for example substituting dividends for (tax efficient) repurchases.  Consistent with 
other theoretical predictions, we find that another effect of having a large shareholder is reduced stock 
liquidity.   
Finally, we note two important caveats.  We have sidestepped the important issue of how other 
large shareholders impact corporate policies and performance, because our instrument does not help 
identify the presence of other owners.  Also, we are not able to separate the effect of the threat of future 
block presence from the immediate impact of existing large shareholders in a firm.  As suggested by 
Manne (1965), the mere threat of actions by blockholders or raiders may influence managerial behavior, 
and if firms in high wealth density states face a higher threat of block formation, this may explain part of 
our results.  To the extent that we are interested in the aggregate impact of large shareholders on firms and 
on the economy, the indirect effect of a threat is important, but, ideally, it should be separately identified. 30
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Assets (log)  Log of total assets (Compustat item 6) 
Average share price  Mean daily closing share price previous year 
Bid-ask spread   Yearly average of the end-of-day relative bid-ask spread, derived from the 
closing bid and ask from CRSP 
Cash holdings  Cash and short-term investments (item 1) divided by lagged net property, 
plant, and equipment (item 8).   
CEO incentive pay   Fraction of toal CEO pay (Execucomp item TDC1) that is paid in either 
stock or options 
CEO pay (log)   Log of the sum of cash salary, cash bonus, and the Black-Scholes value of 
options granted during a fiscal year to the CEO (Execucomp item TDC1) 
Dividend yield  Ratio of the sum of common dividends (item 21) and preferred dividends 
(item 19) over book value of common equity (item 60) or over market 
value of common equity 
Dividend payer   Indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the sum of common dividends (item 
21) and preferred dividends (item 19) > 0, and 0 otherwise 
Dividend payout ratio   Common dividends (item 21) divided by EBITDA (item 18) 
Firm age  Log of months since first listing on stock exchange 
Illiquidity   Yearly average of absolute daily return divided by daily dollar volume, as 
calculated by Amihud (2002). Data come from CRSP 
Institutional block 
ownership
Aggregate ownership by institutions, counting only blocks of 5% or more 
of common equity 
Investment  Capital expenditures (item 128) divided by lagged net property, plant, and 
equipment (item 8) 
Lagged return   Stock market return over the previous fiscal year 
Leverage   Long-term debt (item 9) plus current liabilities (item 34) divided by long-
term debt plus current liabilities plus book value of common equity (item 
60) (book leverage) or divided by long-term debt plus current liabilities 
plus market value of common equity (market leverage) 
Market capitalization  Number of shares outstanding times calendar year closing price (item 25 x 
item 199) 
Nasdaq membership  Dummy variable equal to one for firms listed on NASDAQ, and zero 
otherwise
Number of outsiders on 
board
Number of non-affiliated directors on firm’s board, from the IRRC 
director database 
Return on assets  Ratio of EBITDA (item 18) divided by lagged total assets (item 6) 
Return on sales  Ratio of EBITDA (item 18) divided by lagged total sales (item 12) 
Sales growth  Net sales (item 12) divided by lagged net sales, minus 1 
S, G & A   Selling, general, and administrative expenses (item 189) divided by sales 
(item 12) 
Trading volume   Yearly average of number of shares traded per months divided by total 
shares outstanding 
Volatility  Standard deviation of monthly share price, calculated over previous 24 
months  34
Figure 1: Geographic location of large individual shareholders and firms’ headquarters 
The figure plots the location of large U.S.-based (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) individual shareholders 
as well as the location of firms’ headquarters.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 firms during the 
period 1996-2001.  Blockholders are entities that own at least 5% of the outstanding shares.  A large 
shareholder is classified as an “individual” if the block is owned in the individual’s name or in a family 






























Figure 2: Geographic location of large mutual fund and money manager shareholders and firms’ 
headquarters
The figure plots the location of large U.S.-based (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) mutual fund and money 
manager shareholders as well as the location of firms’ headquarters.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 
1500 firms during the period 1996-2001.  Blockholders are entities that own at least 5% of the 
outstanding shares.  A large shareholder is classified as a “mutual fund” if it offers open-end mutual funds 
to the public.  A large shareholder is classified as a “money manager” if investment services and advice 
are given to endowments, universities, or high net worth individuals, but no shares of the portfolio can be 





























Firm HQ Mutual funds Money managers36
Figure 3: The geographic distribution of high net worth individuals  
The figure shows estimates of the number of high net worth individuals per Compustat firm headquarter 
for each U.S. state.  The wealth data are from the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (SOI) 
data which report the estimated number of individuals with a high net worth in 1995.  The data for firms’ 
headquarters are from Compustat in 1995.  37
Figure 4: Actual versus predicted ultra-wealthy individuals  
The figure plots state by state, the actual number of individuals on the Forbes list of the wealthiest 
Americans (in 1998) against the predicted number of individuals.  We use the wealth data from the 
Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (SOI) database (1998) and the power law distribution 
with a parameter of 1.36 estimated by Levy and Solomon (1997) to predict the number of individuals on 
the list (minimum wealth required to be on the Forbes 1998 list was $430 million).  The correlation 


































Table 1: Distance between large shareholders and firms’ headquarters 
The table shows summary statistics for the distance in miles between the location of a blockholder and the 
headquarters of the firm in which the block is held for four different types of large shareholders.  The four 
types of blockholders are non-managerial individuals, managers (both current and former), mutual funds, 
and money managers.  The summary statistics are based on blockholder-firm-year observations. The 
sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 firms during the period 1996-2001.  Blockholders are entities that 
own at least 5% of the outstanding shares.  The blockholder zip codes are hand-collected from proxy 
statements.  The firms’ zip codes come from the Execucomp database, the Compact Disclosure discs, or 
are hand-collected from proxy statements.  The distances are calculated for U.S. based blockholders 
(excluding Alaska and Hawaii) only, using latitude and longitude data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Gazetteer Place and Zip Code Database.  The indicator variable “Same State” is equal to one if the 
blockholder and firm headquarters are located in the same state, and zero otherwise. 
   Distance  in  miles   
Type of blockholder  N  Mean  Median  Same State 
Non-managerial individual  1,079  464.2  42.5  53.1% 
Managers 2,022  57.3  0  91.3% 
Mutual funds  7,929  1,173.5  1,017.2  9.7% 
Money managers  2,652  1,081.1  857.5  8.7% 39
Table 2: Estimated wealth distributions
The table shows estimates of the number and wealth of high net worth individuals for four U.S. states 
(Oregon, Georgia, New York, California).  The wealth estimates are based on data from the Internal 
Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (SOI) data which reports the estimated number of individuals with 
a high net worth ($1M and up) in 1998.  The wealth of subsamples of these individuals (100 richest, 
number with $100 million or more in net wealth) is estimated assuming individual net wealth follows a 
power law distribution with 
36 . 1 / 1  u   n A Wn for wealth W, and individual rank n. A is a constant.  The 
parameter of 1.36 is estimated by Levy and Solomon (1997), or LS (1997) below.  The 1999 end-of-year 
market value and number of listed firms are constructed from Compustat data.  The sample is non-dual 
class S&P 1500 firms. 
   Oregon  Georgia New York  California  Data source 
Number of individuals with a high net worth  27,000 64,000  243,000  412,000  SOI  (1995) 
Wealth of 100 richest individuals ($M)  17,367 32,759  87,373  128,817  Estimate using  
  their wealth as fraction of state   140%  8%  5%  9%  LS (1997) 
 market  value  1999           
Number of individuals with $100M in wealth  51  122  463  785  Estimate using  
  their wealth as fraction of state   110%  9%  8%  18%  LS (1997) 
 market  value  1999           
Number of sample firms in state (1999)  7  26  70  153  Compustat  
Total market value of equity in 1999 ($M)   12,420  392,538 1,827,770  1,420,483  Compustat  
Median market value in 1999 u 5% ($M)  43  70  171  58  Compustat  
Average market value in 1999 u 5% ($M)  89  755  1,015  597  Compustat  
Largest market value in 1999 u 5% ($M)  259  7,200  17,500  9,700  Compustat  
          
No. of individuals with enough wealth to buy 
5% of:        
Estimates using LS 
(1997) 
  median firm in state  162  198  223  1,659   
  average firm in state  61  8  20  69   
 2
nd largest firm in state  27  0.6  0.6  1.9   
  largest firm in state  14.1  0.4  0.4  1.6   40
Table 3: Summary statistics  
The table shows sample summary statistics.  Panel A shows the number of observations and frequency for 
four types of blockholders: Non-managerial individuals, managers (both current and former), mutual 
funds, and money managers.  Panel B shows mean, median and standard deviation for all other variables.  
The sample size (N) varies across variables because of data availability and because outliers are excluded 
from regressions. All variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 
1500 firms during the period 1996-2001.
Panel A: Blockholders
Type of blockholder  N  Frequency 
Non-managerial individuals  5984  0.118 
Management   5984  0.219 
Mutual funds  5984  0.677 
Money managers  5984  0.305 
Panel B: Regression variables
Variables   N  Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation
Firm age  5979  24.0  20.1  19.13 
ROA 5787  0.047  0.055  0.104 
ROS 5784  0.035  0.047  0.166 
S,G&A 5318  0.251  0.213  0.179 
Investment 5632  0.282  0.221  0.221 
Leverage, BV  5751  0.252  0.246  0.182 
Leverage, long-term only, BV  5755  0.210  0.195  0.169 
Leverage, MV  5744  0.278  0.220  0.277 
Dividend yield, BV  5765  0.020  0.013  0.025 
Dividend yield, MV  5760  0.013  0.006  0.017 
Dividend payout  5765  0.182  0.014  0.491 
Cash holdings  5771  0.146  0.043  0.270 
Number of outsiders on board  5584  7.440  7.000  2.812 
CEO pay (log)  5092  7.820  7.775  1.188 
CEO incentive pay  5092  0.512  0.553  0.285 
Trading volume  5966  0.006  0.004  0.007 
Volatility 5893  0.450  0.392  0.248 
Annualized stock return  5951  0.054  0.089  0.475 
Bid-ask spread  5954  0.017  0.013  0.016 
Illiquidity 5890  0.031  0.004  0.088 41
Table  4: First stage results  
The table shows results from linear probability models and probit regressions of three large shareholder 
variables on measures of the density of high net worth individuals in a state in 1995 and controls.  The 
large shareholder dummy variable is equal to one if an individual non-managerial large shareholder is 
present in the firm, and zero otherwise (columns 1 through 5).  Log (block ownership) is the log of one 
plus the ownership by individual non-managerial blockholders (column 6).  The managerial block dummy 
variable is equal to one if a large individual managerial shareholder is present in the firm, and zero 
otherwise (column 7).  The sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 firms during the period 1996-2001.  
Blockholders are entities that own at least 5% of outstanding shares.  All other variables are defined in the 
Data Appendix.  Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   42
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Regression type  OLS  Probit  Probit Probit Probit  OLS  Probit   
0.190*** 0.892*** 0.691*** 0.724***   0.183**  0.266  Density of high net worth 
individuals, 1995 
(0.060) (0.250) (0.265) (0.276)    (0.084)  (0.224) 
      0.508***      Wealth per listed firm, 1995 
      (0.171)     
Lagged  return      -0.112*  -0.110  -0.026   
      (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.016)   
Log (market value)       -0.035  -0.035  -0.005   
      (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.018)   
Log (assets, book value)        -0.127** -0.125** -0.025   
      (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.016)   
Age      0.018**  0.018**  0.0045*  
      (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.0024)  
Age  squared      -0.00022  -0.00021  -0.00006**   
      (0.00016) (0.00014)  (0.00003)   
Sales  growth      0.163**  0.138*  0.031**  
      (0.067)  (0.070)  (0.015)   
Return on assets (ROA)        -0.050  -0.023  -0.028   
      (0.030)  (0.306)  (0.075)   
Year fixed effects      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry  fixed  effects      Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.008  N/A N/A N/A N/A  0.035  N/A   
           
N  5,972 5,972 5,848 5,821 5,752  5,821  5,821   43
Table 5: Operating performance and large shareholders 
The table shows results from the second stage regression of operating performance measures on a large 
shareholder dummy and control variables. The large shareholder dummy is equal to one if a large 
individual non-managerial shareholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise. It is instrumented in the 
first stage regression with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995.  The last two rows of the 
table show the coefficient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals from the first 
stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy on the density measure and controls.   ˆ U  is the 
estimated correlation between first and second stage error terms.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 
firms during the period 1996-2001.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  Robust 
standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
Dependent variable  ROA  ROS  S, G & A  Investment 
Second  stage  results      
Large shareholder dummy   0.0287**  0.0556***  -0.0540  -0.055* 
[instrumented]  (0.0125) (0.0186) (0.0349) (0.029) 
Controls  Age, age squared, log (market 
value), log (assets), sales growth, 
lagged return, dividend payer 
dummy, dividend yield 
Age, age squared, log (market 
value), log (assets), sales growth, 
lagged return 
Year  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimated  ˆ U -0.193 -0.344 0.263  0.157 
Chi-square test ( ˆ 0 U   ) 4.72** 9.26*** 3.96**  5.05** 
N  5,503 5,488 5,172 5,483 
      
First  stage  results      
Density of high net worth individuals  0.742***  0.769***  0.983***  0.855*** 
 (0.289)  (0.272)  (0.358)  (0.315) 44
Table 6: Capital structure and large shareholders 
The table shows results from the second stage regression of three measures of leverage on a large 
shareholder dummy and control variables. The large shareholder dummy is equal to one if a large 
individual non-managerial shareholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise. It is instrumented in the 
first stage regression with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995.  The last two rows of the 
table show the coefficient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals from the first 
stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy on the density measure and controls.   ˆ U  is the 
estimated correlation between first and second stage error terms.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 
firms during the period 1996-2001.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  Robust 
standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
Dependent variable  Leverage, BV  Long term leverage, BV  Leverage, MV 
Second stage results       
Large shareholder dummy  -0.034  -0.0386*  -0.0523 
[instrumented] (0.028)  (0.0206)  (0.0428) 
Controls  Age, age squared, log (market value), log (assets), sales growth, ROA, 
dummy for dividend payers, lagged return 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimated  ˆ U 0.142 0.137 0.039 
Chi-square test ( ˆ 0 U   ) 6.40** 6.20**  2.48 
N 5,652  5,655  5,553 
      
First stage results       
Density of high net worth individuals  0.695**  0.685**  0.745** 
 (0.289)  (0.287)  (0.295) 45
Table 7: Payout policy, cash holdings, and large shareholders 
The table shows results from the second stage regression of five measures of payout policy on a large 
shareholder dummy and control variables. The large shareholder dummy is equal to one if a large 
individual non-managerial shareholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise. It is instrumented in the 
first stage regression with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995.  The last two rows of the 
table show the coefficient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals from the first 
stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy on the density measure and controls.   ˆ U  is the 
estimated correlation between first and second stage error terms.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 
firms during the period 1996-2001.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  Robust 
standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   





ratio  Cash holdings  Repurchase payout
Second  stage  results       
Large shareholder dummy  0.0576***  0.0197***  0.226*  -0.0567**  -0.134** 
[instrumented] (0.00374)  (0.0022)  (0.121)  (0.0278)  (0.0633) 
Controls  Age, age squared, log (market value), log (assets), sales growth, ROA, lagged return 
       
Year  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated  ˆ U -0.832 -0.693 -0.251 0.077  0.079 
Chi-square test ( ˆ 0 U   ) 172.0*** 18.79***  2.00  1.85  7.08*** 
N  5,592 5,605 5,693 5,606 5,245 
      
First  stage  results       
0.490*** 0.566*** 0.747*** 0.730***  0.737***  Density of high net worth 
individuals 
(0.172) (0.206) (0.258) (0.284)  (0.274) 46
Table 8: Managerial compensation, governance mechanisms, and large shareholders 
The table shows results from the second stage regression of CEO pay and board structure on a large 
shareholder dummy and control variables. The large shareholder dummy is equal to one if a large 
individual non-managerial shareholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise. It is instrumented in the 
first stage regression with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995.  The last two rows of the 
table show the coefficient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals from the first 
stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy on the density measure and controls.   ˆ U  is the 
estimated correlation between first and second stage error terms.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 
firms during the period 1996-2001.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  Robust 
standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
Dependent variable  CEO pay (log)  CEO incentive pay   No. of outsiders on board 
Second stage results       
Large shareholder dummy  -0.938***  -0.447***  1.598* 
[instrumented] (0.200)  (0.046)  (0.952) 
Controls  Age, age squared, log (market value), log (assets), sales growth, ROA, dummy 
for dividend payers, lagged return) 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimated  ˆ U 0.496 0.749  -0.368 
Chi-square test ( ˆ 0 U   ) 14.38*** 63.45***  1.83 
N 4,279  5,004  5,368 
      
First stage results       
Density of high net worth   0.907***  0.600***  0.716*** 
individuals (0.310)  (0.269)  (0.278) 47
Table 9: Liquidity and large shareholders 
The table shows results from the second stage regression of measures of liquidity on a large shareholder 
dummy and control variables. The large shareholder dummy is equal to one if a large individual non-
managerial shareholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise. It is instrumented in the first stage 
regression with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995.  The last two rows of the table show the 
coefficient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals from the first stage probit 
regression of the large shareholder dummy on the density measure and controls.   ˆ U  is the estimated 
correlation between first and second stage error terms.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 firms 
during the period 1996-2001.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  Robust standard 
errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
Dependent variable  Trading volume Bid-ask  spread  Illiquidity 
Second stage results       
Large shareholder dummy  -0.00381***  0.0153***  0.120** 
[instrumented] (0.00086)  (0.0009)  (0.182) 
Controls  Age, age squared, log (market value), log (assets), sales growth, lagged 
return, ROA, dummy for dividend payers, institutional block 
ownership, dummy of Nasdaq membership, average share price, 
volatility  
Other controls    Trading volume  Trading volume 
     
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Estimated  ˆ U 0.355 -0.771 -0.684 
Chi-square test ( ˆ 0 U   ) 14.64*** 128.56*** 26.69*** 
N  5,704 3,909 5,702 
     
First stage results       
0.821*** 0.376*  0.400*  Density of high net worth individuals 
(0.273) (0.222) (0.208) 48
Table 10: First stage results with “placebo instruments”  
The table shows probit regressions of a blockholder indicator variable on the density of high net worth 
individuals in 1995 (column (1)) and other variables that vary on a state level (columns (2) through (6)).  
Columns (7) and (8) include all variables as regressors, and column (8) also contains year and industry 
fixed effects.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 firms during the period 1996-2001.  The large 
shareholder dummy variable is equal to one if a large individual non-managerial shareholder is present in 
the firm, and zero otherwise.  Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.   
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
Dependent variable  Large shareholder (dummy)  
Regression  type  Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
0.892***           0.772*** 0.578** Density of high net worth  
individuals 
(0.220)           (0.242)  (0.273) 
Population density    -0.011          -0.064  -0.067 
   (0.010)          (0.057)  (0.061) 
Income inequality (household)      -1.62        5.52  4.99 
    (2.14)       (3.93)  (4.26) 
Per capita income (median)        -0.020**      -0.0014  -0.0001 
       (0.080)     (0.0016)  (0.0002) 
Per capita income (average)          -0.033*  -0.0029  -0.0028 
         (0.017)    (0.0049)  (0.0054) 
Poverty rate            0.462  -6.44*  -4.36 
           (1.82)  (3.84)  (4.30) 
Year fixed effects                Yes 
Industry  fixed  effects             Yes 
              
N  5,972 5,972 5,972 5,972 5,972 5,972 5,972 5,972 49
Table 11: Comparison of instrumental variable and OLS estimates  
The table compares instrumental variable (IV) and OLS estimates of non-managerial individual 
blockholder effects on firms.  Each reported number corresponds to a separately estimated coefficient on 
the large shareholder dummy variable for the different dependent variables.  We use the same control 
variables in each regression as those in Tables 5-9.  The IV column shows the estimated second stage 
coefficients on the instrumented large non-managerial individual shareholder dummy variable. It is 
instrumented with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995.  The OLS column shows the 
corresponding OLS estimate of the large non-managerial individual shareholder dummy variable.  All 
variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered 
by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
Dependent variables  IV   OLS  
ROA 0.0287**  -0.0019 
ROS 0.0556***  -0.0009 
S, G & A  -0.054  0.0127 
Investment   -0.055*  -0.0028 
Leverage, BV   -0.034  0.0057 
Long term leverage, BV   -0.0386*  -0.0091 
Leverage, MV  -0.0523  0.0090 
Dividend yield, BV   0.0576***  0.0069** 
Dividend yield, MV   0.0197***  0.0025** 
Dividend payout ratio    0.226*  0.029 
Cash holdings   -0.0567**  -0.0134 
CEO pay (log)   -0.938***  -0.189*** 
CEO incentive pay (log)   -0.447***  -0.048*** 
Number of outside directors   1.598*  0.310** 
Trading volume   -0.00381*** -0.00175*** 
Bid-ask spread   0.0153***  0.0010 
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